



















Directed matching with endogenous Markov probability: 
Clients or competitors?
by Emanuela CiapannaThe purpose of the Temi di discussione series is to promote the circulation of working 
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside 
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the 
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial Board:  Domenico J. Marchetti, Patrizio Pagano, Ugo Albertazzi, Michele 
Caivano,  Stefano  Iezzi,  Paolo  Pinotti, Alessandro  Secchi,  Enrico  Sette,  Marco 
Taboga, Pietro Tommasino.
Editorial Assistants:  Roberto Marano, Nicoletta Olivanti.DIRECTED MATCHING WITH ENDOGENOUS MARKOV PROBABILITY: 






We analyze the problem of strategic poaching of consultants by clients with 
particular reference to the business consulting industry. This article studies the strategic 
interaction of consulting groups, client firms and consultants, which gives rise to a market 
equilibrium in a mixed economy. At each date the consulting group faces a new client firm 
that requires a task to be performed. We show that under very general conditions, when a 
matching pair of clients and consultants meets, a dominant strategy will be played, where the 
consultant is captured by the client and the consulting group matches (whenever possible) 
the client's request. The novelty of this model is that the quality of the consulting services 
does not depend only on the consulting group's assignment strategy , but also on the 
capturing behavior of the clients. In this sense, the clients impose a consumption externality 
on each other, which is a source of inefficiency in this otherwise competitive market. 
 
JEL Classification: D62, J41, L22, L84, M54. 
Keywords: strategic poaching, two-sided matching, Nash bargaining, endogenous Markov 





2. Related literature..................................................................................................................5 
3. The directed matching model ..............................................................................................8 
3.1 Strategy  profiles..........................................................................................................11 
3.2  Probability of a good match: a market quality measure.............................................14 
3.3  The client's problem....................................................................................................16 
3.4  The consultant's problem............................................................................................17 
3.4  The Nash bargaining solution.....................................................................................17 
3.5  The consulting goup's problem...................................................................................18 
3.6 Equilibrium  outcome..................................................................................................21 
3.7 Limiting  behavior......................................................................................................25 




                                                 
* Bank of Italy,  Department for Structural Economic Analysis. 
 1. Introduction
1
In an economy characterized by uncertainty about potential employees ability and
by labor-contract rigidities, rents can often be extracted by labor intermediaries, such as
consulting groups or independent contractors, in return for ￿exibility and information. These
middlemen furnish their clients quali￿ed consultants to perform speci￿c tasks for a set period
of time. If the quality of the match between consultants’skills and clients’ requests proves
to be satisfactory, then clients may ￿nd convenient to offer consultants a stable position in
their organization, draining human capital from the consulting group. The business-economic
literature refers to the practice of raiding key employees from competitors as "strategic
poaching". As Peter Cappelli notes, "...Most executives today are poachers: they regularly
lookoutsidetheirorganizationto￿ndkeyindividualsto￿llkeyposts..."(Cappelli2000). Open
competition for other companies’ people is now becoming quite widespread. Fast-moving
markets require fast-moving organizations that are continually regenerated with new talent
and have become adept at outside hiring. Executives tend to be judged on their ability to instill
loyalty in their people and the departure of a talented employee can be viewed as a failure; on
the other hand, given the tightness of the labor market, it can be very hard and very costly to
replace high level human capital.
Though strategic poaching is spreading quite uniformly across industries, it represents a
more serious threat to companies, such as consulting groups, that assign their own employees
to clients. For them the risk of losing their human capital investment is twofold, coming from
bothcompetitorsandcustomers. Thelatter, infact, opportunisticallyexploittheentireduration
of the project to test the consultant’s ability "on the job". Afterwards, they can use their inside
information to decide whether or not to make a job offer to the consultant (human capital is an
experience good).
The practice of hiring ex-consultants has proved detrimental to the whole global
consulting industry. In a recent article in Fortune, Peter Luiks cites strategic poaching by
clients as one of the main factors responsible for the ongoing shrinking of big consulting
1 I am indebted to Hsueh-Ling Huynh and Michael Manove for their support and guidance. I also thank
Bart Lipman, Albert Ma, Marco Li Calzi, Nandini Krishnan, Francesca Lotti, Marco Taboga, two anonimous
referees and participants at Boston University and Bank of Italy workshops, SES and International Industrial
Organization Conference for helpful suggestions. Any errors are solely mine. The opinions expressed in this
paper do not necessarily re￿ect those of the Bank of Italy. E-mail: emanuela.ciapanna@bancaditalia.it4
groups. "Many large companies simply raid the consulting ￿rms for talent. At AOL Time
Warner, whichisspending75%lessonconsultingthanitdid￿veyearsago, 12ofthe19people
in the company’s strategy group are recently hired ex-consultants from McKinsey, Bain, and
BCG. American Express, which spends a fraction of what it used to on consulting, has picked
up at least ￿fty people from McKinsey in the past year" (Luiks 2004).
In this paper we analyze the practice of strategic poaching of consultants by clients with
particular reference to the business consulting industry. We interpret the market for consulting
services as a market for quality goods with externalities. Consulting groups are viewed as
middlemen, endowedwithbothaninformativeandanallocativerole: theyobservetherequests
submitted by their clients as well as the skills available in the pool of their consultants and
use this information to help the two sides of the market to meet more ef￿ciently. That is, they
gatherinformationthatwouldotherwisebedispersed(productioninput), theyoptimallydecide
an allocation strategy (production technology), in order to provide high quality consultant-
client matches (production output). The presence of a middleman is justi￿ed by an imperfect
market that fails to convey all the information to the agents. Nevertheless, due to transaction
costs and capacity constraints, the consulting group cannot always provide a perfect match,
which generates distorted incentives among clients, who will poach consultants as soon as
somebody with the right pro￿le is assigned to them (a negative consumption externality).
Clients "consume" good quality by poaching people, whose skills are known, and consulting
￿rms have to replace them with new hires of unknown type. As a result, the information
available to the consulting group gets noisier (inputs worsen), the number of strategic states of
nature decreases, and the market probability of creating good matches in the future is further
depressed.
The paper has two, analytically independent parts. The ￿rst part examines the consulting
groups’ assignment mechanism as an endogenous Markov process with learning and capacity
constraints. Through this process we generate the quality variable Q that will be de￿ned as the
probability of a "good" match. This probability is the outcome of consulting ￿rms competing
in the market. They hire new consultants and gradually learn their abilities, and they meet
clients, who demand different tasks. Once a consultant has worked for a client, his type
becomes known to the client as well as to the consulting group. The latter uses this information
in deciding future assignments. Meanwhile, the client ￿rms use the same information to decide5
whether to capture the consultants. When a capture occurs, it is reasonable to assume that the
consulting group, which lost its consultant, will suffer a cost -search, training, etc.- before the
employee can be replaced.
The second part of the model analyzes the strategic market interaction of the three
players: consulting groups, client ￿rms and consultants, who take Q as given. We show that
the market for consulting services is a market for quality goods with externalities. Given
capacity constraints and replacement costs, consulting groups are not able to guarantee a good
match with certainty (so that in equilibrium Q < 1 ), which creates a gap between social
and individual optimality. Every time a good match is realized, a bilateral monopoly formes
between the consultant and the client, who bargain on a new employment contract. This
individual opportunistic behavior creates an externality among the clients: expected match
quality and social welfare are further depressed. On the other hand, the need to break even
induces the consulting groups to adopt a policy of quality maximization. We show that
the game has an equilibrium in dominant strategies, which consists in the consulting group
providing the best expected quality given its current inventory and the client poaching the
consultant whenever the joint net surplus is positive. On the one hand, this result reinforces
the thesis that economic competition provides good incentives to supply high quality products.
On the other hand, ironically, the very fact that the middlemen outperform the market in
conveying information, allows the clients to capture consultants. This has a negative impact
on quality (externality). Without an explicit premium on capture (i.e. pricing the externality),
inef￿ciencies will persist in this market.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the main contributions in the
literature; Section 3 presents the model and the equilibrium strategies; Section 4 discusses the
main results and concludes. Proofs that are not in the main text are provided in the Appendix.
2. Related literature
The question relates to three strands in the literature: labor search (Jovanovic 1979,
Mortensen 1985, Acemoglu 1997, Moen 1997, Pissarides 2000, Davis 2001), matching (Lu
and McAfee 1996, Acemoglu and Shimer 1999, Shimer and Smith 2000, Moscarini 2005), and
the theory of incentives and mechanism design (Laffont and Martimort 2002). Our analysis6
shares with the Search literature the interpretation of future job offers as an option pricing
problem; it uses the link between bargaining and matching typical of Cooperative Games
Models; and has some interesting features in common with the Queue Theory (Huynh and
Rosenthal 2000) and Assignment Mechanism Design literature (Prescott and Townsend 2003,
Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini, 2007).
In the classic search models with two-sided market, heterogeneous agents are drawn
from a commonly known distribution and assigned to their counterpart. In those models all the
strategic interaction between the two sides of the market occurs after a match is exogenously
realized. In this paper, we examine more closely a mechanism that generates the consultant-
client assignment. This results in an endogenous Markov chain, re￿ecting the optimizing
behavior of the match maker and of the other players that form the matching pair.
While the study of the economic role of intermediaries in both ￿nancial and labor
markets has been well explored in the literature (Bhattacharya and Yavas 1993, Yavas 1994,
Autor 2001, 2005), the economic problem and the modelling strategy that we present here
are original and probably share more elements with the ￿nance literature on microstructures
than with the micro-labor contributions or with assignment models ￿ la Prescott and Townsend
(Prescott and Townsend 2003).
The micro-labor literature explains the existence of middlemen with reference to two
features of search markets: uncertainty and externalities. On one side, the search efforts of
the agents may not be successful and may not result in a match, on the other the matching
technologycanbesuchthatthesearchcostssustainedbyoneagentaffectthegainsfromsearch
realized by his counterpart. These models view the middleman as an institution that can extract
a rent by reducing the uncertainty and internalize some externalities. There are essentially two
types of intermediary: market makers and match makers. A market maker sets an ask and a bid
price at which he sells and buys for his own account (e.g. brokers and dealers operating in the
stock market, used car dealers, e-commerce operators and so forth) (Bhattacharya and Yavas
1993, Gehrig 1993). A match maker doesn’t trade, but simply matches agents from the two
sides: buyers and sellers, as with real estate brokers, or ￿rms and workers, as with temporary
employment agencies (Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1987, Yavas 1994, Autor 2005).
Our work considers a special kind of middleman: the consulting group, which operates
both as a match maker and as a market maker. In fact, like match makers, it helps demand7
and supply to meet more ef￿ciently (acting like a temporary agency). On the other hand, like
market makers, it offers human resources to perform speci￿c tasks, charging clients a fee (ask
price); and to do so it hires consultants paying them a salary (bid price). It is important to note
that the consulting group shares with a market maker the characteristic of buying and selling
for its own account. In this sense, it is very different from a temporary agency, which is a
pure match maker. The consulting ￿rm does match agents from the two sides of the market,
but the main object of the contract subscribed with the client is the service (the end) and not
the consultant (the means). This subtle difference must be grasped in order to comprehend
the rationale of this work. Here we are not just studying poaching and its implication for any
middleman. We propose to analyze a special kind of market, where poaching is a problem
rather than part of the ordinary activity. And it is a more sensitive issue than it would be for
business generically understood, because the threat comes from clients, not from competitors.
Inthissense, consultinggroupsareparticularlyvulnerabletopoaching. Theyhavenoincentive
to close themselves towards their potential poachers, which makes the trade-off more complex,
but also -we think- more interesting.
The existing theoretical models focus on the search behavior of the agents and on the
effect that the presence of a middleman can have on the gains from trade and on search
intensity. This article focuses on the allocative role of middlemen in a mixed market
economy, whereconsulting￿rmscompeteandmakezeropro￿ts, whileclientsandconsultants,
once matched, form bilateral monopolies when bargaining on the new employment contract.
Our theoretical framework and notion of equilibrium are conceptually close to the market
microstructure approach, (Kyle 1985, Glosten and Milgrom 1985, Veldkamp 2004). For
instance, in his rational expectations model, Kyle assumes batch-clearing; that is, all orders
are ful￿lled simultaneously at the same price; in our model all the consulting ￿rms ful￿ll their
clients’ requests at the same market price, which depends on match quality. Kyle assumes
that there is a market maker, who sets prices and thus acts as an auctioneer. Moreover, the
market maker can take trading positions and has privileged access to information on the
order ￿ow. This changes the nature of the pricing rule, because price setting is assigned to
a player within the model. The market maker must set prices using only the information
available to him, which is determined by the trading protocol. In our model the consulting
market as a whole acts in a competitive fashion, implementing a Walrasian mechanism: the
simultaneous and dispersed optimizing behavior of rational agents, each elaborating his own8
available information, is aggregated by the market, which performs both an allocative and an
informative role.
3. The directed matching model
We model the market for consulting services as a pair-wise random matching and
bargaining process. The basic structure of the model is the following. There are three
categories of agents in the economy: consulting groups, consultants and client ￿rms.
Consultants’ and clients’ requests can be only of two types: A or B
2. A client ￿rm can
access a consultant only through a consulting company. That is, we do not allow direct contact
between customers and self-employed consultants
3.
We assume an in￿nite time horizon. The timeline is as follows: at each period there are
Y consulting ￿rms operating in the market. Clients’ arrival is represented by an exogenous
process with arrival rate ￿. A client can contact a consulting group, requiring performance of
task A or B. Then the consulting group chooses which type of consultant to assign. When
submitting the request, the client takes as given both consulting market fees and the quality
level of services prevailing in the market, Q: In our model, this quality variable is crucial: it
is the probability that the consulting group will implement a good match between the client’s
requirement and the consultant sent to perform the speci￿c task.
We assume asymmetric information between the consulting group and the client ￿rm at
this stage: the client cannot ex ante observe the type of consultant that is sent to him. At the
end of the period, after the task has been performed, the quality of the match is observable and
veri￿able by all the players. Once the quality of the match is revealed, the client can make a
"poaching" offer to the consultant. The client-consultant pair will bargain on compensation,
solving an optimal stopping problem and deciding whether it is advantageous to exercise the
option and subscribe a regular employment contract and cut out the middleman or to remain
2 We assume horizontal differentiation in this model. Consultants’ and clients’ requests are not ranked
according to their level of complexity (from low to high), they pertain to different business areas or different ￿elds
(￿nancial services rather than IT). We construct an analogous model with vertical differentiation. The results are
analogous, but the algebra is much more tedious, so we chose to focus on the horizontal differentiation case.
3 This assumpion is consistent with the empirical evidence in many markets, such as security services,
business consulting and other activities that are not usually purchased browsing the yellow pages, in a direct way,
but through complex organizations.9
in the intermediated market. The structure of the game, at this stage, resembles two-sided
matching models with heterogeneous agents and endogenous disagreement point (Lu and
McAfee 1996, Shimer and Smith 2000 and Moscarini 2005). If the joint surplus, net of the
sum of the players’ disagreement points, is positive, then the client ￿nds it convenient to make
an offer (we call c > 0 the client’s capturing rate) and in case of acceptance by the counterpart,
the spoils generated by the match are shared evenly
4.
Every time a consultant is hired by a client ￿rm, the consulting group is left with a
vacancy: it has to replace the lost human resource and to do so it faces a cost C that re￿ects
screening, training investment, search costs and so on. Once the inventory is restored, we are
back to the ￿rst stage: a new request is made and the game starts over again.
Thus, if X is the steady state number of clients at any period and Y is the corresponding
number of consulting groups in our economy, with X ￿ Y , then in each period there may be
a certain number of consulting ￿rms that are idle, depending on the dynamics that follow from
the capturing behavior of the clients. Moreover, given a constant arrival rate ￿; we have that
in steady state the number of client ￿rms X is endogenously determined and has to satisfy the
following:
X = [(1 ￿ Q) + Q(1 ￿ c)]X + ￿ (1)





where c is the capture rate and Q the probability of a good match. Therefore, the probability









(respectively 1 ￿ ￿) (4)
4 We suppose that with a good match the two parties (the client and the consultant) always obtain a greater
utility than with a bad match, regardless their internalization strategy, so that capturing in the case of a bad match
is always strictly dominated.10
We assume that in each period there are only two consultants available in the consulting
group’s inventory
5. Their type can be known or unknown to the consulting group, depending
on whether they have already worked there for at least one period or have just been hired from
among the indifferentiated pool of self-employed consultants. Thus, our state space is given by
the Cartesian product between the client’s request fA;Bg and the inventory possibility set, K:
The latter is given by six entries, K := fNN; NA; NB; AB; AA; BBg where N stands for
"new". Therefore the consulting group can send an A, a B or an N type consultant in response
to each client’s request.
Let m be the realization of the match quality and suppose, for simplicity, that m is a
binary variable: m = 0 in case of a bad match and m = 1 in case of a good match. When
the customer comes to the consulting group, fees are commonly known and contractually
established without ambiguity. If the quality of the match is low (m = 0); a low fee, FL; will
be charged by the consulting group; if it is high (m = 1); a high fee, FH: Thus we assume
0 ￿ FL ￿ FH. Similarly, the consulting salary, earned by consultants while working at the
group, is also conditional on the match quality. If the project is a mismatch with respect to their
type, then the outcome will be "low quality" and the resulting salary will be the reservation
wage, R:
6 In the case of a good match, they may earn a higher salary, W, where W ￿ R:
7
We suppose that, once revealed, quality is perfectly observable and veri￿able to all agents, so
a contingent contract can be signed based on the quality of the match.
Our equilibrium concept is a competitive equilibrium in a mixed economy. That is, we
have two different market levels in this model. On one side, consulting ￿rms are perfectly
competitive: they act in a market (the market for quality goods) with free entry, where they are
price-takers and have to break even in expectation. On the other side, each time a good match
is realized the client-consultant pair forms a bilateral monopoly. They are now two precise
5 This assumption may seem restrictive, but the right way of thinking about it is to focus on the client’s
request as the event that marks the start of the game. That is, we can imagine that in each period there are
several clients contacting the consulting group and making their requests, but we just choose to concentrate on
a representative client. In this way it seems reasonable that the group faces an inventory constraint in its human
resources: other consultants are working on other projects or at other clients.
6 We can interpret the reservation wage, exogenously given, as what the consultant would earn if he worked
as an independent contractor in a non-intermediated market.
7 Here W is endogenous. It seems realistic to assume that the consultant gets a sort of productivity bonus
in case of a good match. This is very common in the business and economic consulting industry, where salaries
are usually structured as non-linear tariffs. Notice, however that R and W are ranked by weak inequality.11
identities, for the moment they are out of the market of consulting services, and they bargain
in Nash fashion over the offer (Kyle 1985, Glosten and Milgrom 1985, Veldkamp 2004).
The consulting group faces a trade-off: in the case of a good match, a higher fee can
be charged, but capture is more likely; whereas a bad (or uncertain) match reduces the risk of
poaching at the cost of a lower fee. An equilibrium strategy is such that the two forces driving
the trade-off are balanced.
3.1 Strategy pro￿les
In the market for consulting services our three categories of agents optimally choose
a strategy pro￿le that maximizes their expected utilities given the market prices P =
[FH;FL;W], the replacement cost C; the reservation wage R and the market quality variable Q.
The latter is the prevailing and commonly known probability of occurrence of a good match.
We restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria. We look for a competitive equilibrium
where the consulting group makes zero expected pro￿t and the client-consultant pair, once
formed, optimally chooses whether or not to form a stable match.
The possible mixed strategies for the consulting group are represented by the following
set of conditional probabilities:
ACG (K) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
rA = Prfsend A when request = A and state = NAg
wA = Prfsend A when request = B and state = NAg
wB = Prfsend B when request = A and state = NBg
rB = Prfsend B when request = B and state = NBg
pA = Prfsend A when request = A and state = ABg
pB = Prfsend B when request = B and state = ABg
These conditional probabilities represent the mixed strategy space for the consulting group:
ACG (K): The possible strategies for the consulting group are depicted in Fig.1. For




ranked; they only represent two different sectors of consulting or, in general, two independent
skills. Therefore, we suppose that prices do not depend on the type of request from the client
8 This assumption is without loss of generality and it is introduced as the consequent symmetric structure is
more treatable in derivations.12
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this hypothesis rA = rB = r; wA = wB = w and the states AA;BB are renamed OO (two
oldies), while the states NA;NB are now called NO (a new and an old hire). Therefore, the





r = Prfmatching client’s request when state = NAg
w = Prfnot matching client’s request when state = NAg
p = Prfmatching client’s request when state = ABg
Let ￿ := fGood Match, Bad Matchg be the state space for the client ￿rm-consultant





c = PrfCapture given good matchg
(1 ￿ c) = PrfDo not capture given good matchg
0 = PrfCapture given bad matchg
1 = PrfDo not capture given bad matchg





a = PrfAccept offer given good match and offerg
(1 ￿ a) = PrfDo not Accept offer given good match and offerg
0 = PrfAccept offer given bad matchg
1 = PrfDo not Accept offer given bad matchg
We can see that the strategy "Capture given bad match " is strictly dominated, because it
results in a certain loss for the client, so it will never be part of an equilibrium.
9 What if consulting groups were to specialize? In our construction, due to the clients’ poaching behavior,
specialization would never be optimal. In fact, assume it was to specialize in type A requests. Then, whenever
capturing occurs and replacement is needed, the consulting group ￿lls the vacancy with an N type. With prob-
ability 1
2 N is a B type, therefore if only A type requests are accepted, the consulting group does not exploit the
possibility of employing a type B as part of a good match. Recall that clients’ requests are for type A or B; with
probability 1
2.14
3.2 The probability of "good match": a market quality measure
The Markov chain associated with the de￿ned conditional probabilities has the following
transition matrix:
P =
NN NO AB OO













AB 0 ￿pc 1 ￿ ￿pc 0
OO 0 ￿ c
2 0 1 ￿ ￿ c
2




















(2 ￿ c)[(1 ￿ r) + (1 ￿ w)(1 ￿ c)]






2+4pc(2 ￿ c)+(2 ￿ c)[(1 ￿ r) + (1 ￿ w)(1 ￿ c)]+ (6)
+2p(2 ￿ c)[(1 ￿ w) + (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ c)]
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 2 The invariant distribution ￿ is independent of the probability of being active, ￿;
which does not affect the convergence behavior of the Markov chain.




















0 = [I ￿ P 0]￿
and it is unique up to each admissible combination for the parameter value.15
This probability is endogenous in the model, obtained by substituting for the expression of the





2prc2+p(2 ￿ c)[(1 ￿ w) + (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ c)]+
+p(2 ￿ c)[(1 ￿ r) + (1 ￿ w)(1 ￿ c)]+pc(2 ￿ c)(2 + r ￿ w)
￿
(7)
where D is given by 6.
The Markov probability Q is the key variable in the model. It represents the output of
the consulting group "production function" and also a measure of ef￿ciency of the consulting
market. In fact, if we were to look at a non-intermediated market, where consultants are
freelancers, the probability of a good match would be QD = 1
2; a third best.
11 In this sense,
any value of Q higher than this benchmark makes the intermediated market more ef￿cient
than the totally decentralized one. We saw how the role of consulting groups is justi￿ed by
the existence of frictions in the labor market, in particular lack of information and search
costs. The intermediary has an advantage in gathering and conveying information. What is
the source of this advantage? The consulting group has an inventory of human resources that
allows it to act strategically with respect to clients’ demand. In an anonymous pool of self-
employed consultants, the client ￿nds either an A or a B type with equal probability, and the
same is true for his counterpart. A complex and larger corporation, like a consulting group, can
partially solve this problem, as it collects and manages many requests and counts on a pool of
different types at the same time. Therefore, unless the other agents behave opportunistically,
the intermediated market would yield quite an ef￿cient outcome in terms of quality.
It is easy to see that, if poaching does not occur, it would be possible to reach a level of
match quality as high as QSB = 3
4; well above 1
2!
12 Therefore, the presence of the intermediary
reduces inef￿ciencies, as it is the case in most of results aimed at ￿nding a rationale for
middlemen.
13 Nevertheless, due to the presence of inventory constrains and transaction costs,
11 This is because we assume that types A and B have equal shares in the population.
12 In our construction, due to capacity constraints faced by the consulting group, Q = 1 can never be reached,
not even in a theoretical equilibrium entailing c￿ = 0: This is true as long as the inventory of human resources at
the consulting group only consists of two consultants per period. In fact, we would always have to assign positive
probability to the state OO where the group is stuck with the same pro￿le of consultant and this pro￿le does not
meet the request.
A more detailed discussion is given in section 3.6.
13 In fact, the micro-labor literature explains the existence of middlemen with reference to two features of16
the ￿rst best, QFB = 1; cannot be reached, even in presence of middlemen. The motivation
is subtle. If QFB = 1 is not implementable, then the clients have an incentive to capture as
soon as they observe a joint positive surplus (given market fees and disagreement points). But
this opportunistic behavior introduces another externality, a consumption one. Each time a
consultant is poached, he must be replaced with an unknown type; this introduces noise in the
consulting group’s inventory and worsens the overall quality in the market: Q￿ = QTB < 3
4:
Thus, the consulting group ￿nds room in the market for complex services because of market
failure in pooling human resources of different types; but once it has entered, it introduces a
consumption externality due to poaching. This ef￿ciency analysis and the value of Q in the
decentralized framework provides an important benchmark for our results. Is the equilibrium
value Q￿ higher than QD? How much lower is it than QSB? We can answer these question
once we have solved the three-agent model.
3.3 The client’s problem
From the client’s point of view there are two possible states at every period. We call the





!1 := right match
Q
!2 := wrong match
1 ￿ Q
Therefore the value function of the client takes the form V (￿) = (V (!1);V (!2)) such
that:
V (!1) = max
c
n
(1 ￿ FH) + c￿
s
2
+ ￿ [QV (!1) + (1 ￿ Q)V (!2)]
o
(8)
V (!2) = ￿FL + ￿ [QV (!1) + (1 ￿ Q)V (!2)] (9)
where c is the capturing rate, i.e. the probability of poaching in the event of a good match,
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 is the discount factor and s is the joint net surplus.
search markets: uncertainty and externalities.17
3.4 The consultant’s problem
We analyze the optimization program of a consultant who is working for the consulting
group. The possible states in every period are represented by ￿ = f!1;!2g and because the
consultant is called to decide only if the client ￿nds it advantageous to make an offer, only in
state !1 does the consultant act as a strategic player.
Therefore, the value function for the consultant takes the form:






+ W + ￿ [QU (!1) + (1 ￿ Q)U (!2)]
o
(10)
where a represents the offer acceptance rate.
U (!2) = R + ￿ [QU (!1) + (1 ￿ Q)U (!2)] (11)
3.5 The Nash-bargaining solution
We assume that whenever a consultant and a client form a good match, they play a
bargaining game, and if the net surplus from the match is positive, they choose to become




￿ [(QV (!1) + (1 ￿ Q)V (!2)) + QU (!1) + (1 ￿ Q)U (!2)] > 0
The inequality above represents the condition under which the joint net surplus is positive
and the players ￿nd it advantageous to form a long run match.
14 The ￿rst term, 1
(1￿￿);
15
represents the total gross surplus from a good match when they decide to start a permanent
labor relationship, while the second term is the sum of the two agents’ disagreement points.
14 In the Nash bargaining mechanism the following always holds:
a = c
Because our players have endogenous disagreement points the spoils they are going to share are represented by
the net surplus where it is positive, i.e. whenever matching is positively assortative.




1 if good match
0 if bad match18
De￿ning
V : = (QV (!1) + (1 ￿ Q)V (!2))
















a good match. In fact, a match is good or bad depending only on the assignment of types, i.e.
on the output quality the consulting group can provide to the market, while the surplus is also
in￿uenced by monetary variables, such as salaries and fees. Therefore, "good match" is a
necessary, but not a suf￿cient condition for positive surplus.
16
Proposition 4 For any Q < 1 and any C > 0; and for any vector of market prices
[W FL FH];each time that a good match occurs, the consultant and the client have a dominant
strategy that is always to capture (c = 1). This means that the internalization option is always
exercised when a good match occurs, no matter how much it may cost in terms of surplus
share.
Proof. In appendix.
3.6 The consulting group’s problem
To study the optimization problem of the consulting group, ￿rst note that it can be in one
of six states of nature:
NN
ORN (the old consultant matches the client’s request)
OWN (the old consultant does not match the client’s request)
AB
OOR (the old consultant matches the client’s request)
OOW (the old consultant does not match the client’s request)
16 In our model we shall see that it also suf￿cient, but we think the caveat is needed.19
Hence, the value function for the consulting group is:
V (K) = (V (NN);V (ORN);V (OWN);V (AB);V (OOR);V (OOW))

































2 (FH ￿ W ￿ cC + c￿V (NN) + (1 ￿ c)￿V (ON))+
+1









w(FL ￿ R + ￿V (ON)) + (1 ￿ w) 1
2 (FH ￿ W ￿ cC + c￿V (NN))+
+(1 ￿ w) 1
2 ((1 ￿ c)￿V (ON))+
+(1 ￿ w) 1




V (AB) = max
p
￿
p(FH ￿ W ￿ cC + c￿V (ON) + (1 ￿ c)￿V (AB))+
+(1 ￿ p)(FL ￿ R + ￿V (AB))
￿
(19)
V (OOR) = FH ￿ W ￿ cC + c￿V (ON) + (1 ￿ c)￿V (OO) (20)
V (OOW) = FL ￿ R + ￿V (OO) (21)20
We have assumed that the market for consulting services is competitive; therefore
consulting companies break even in expectation. That is, the present discounted value of its
expected pro￿t must be equal to zero.
We ￿rst show that, in this framework, calculating expected pro￿ts as the expectation
of the instantaneous pro￿ts weighted by transition probabilities is equivalent to calculating
the expectation of long run pro￿ts with respect to the invariant distribution, the steady state
probability.
Lemma 5 Let ￿(s) be the long-run expected pro￿t for the consulting group in state s, ￿ (s)
the instantaneous pro￿t in state s; P(s0 js) the generic transition probability between states
s and s0; and ￿ (s) the invariant probability distribution associated with state s: Then, in a
steady state, the two following conditions are equivalent:













From the previous lemma we can write the zero pro￿t condition based on the per-period




2￿ (NN) + 3
4￿ (NO) + ￿ (AB) + 1
2￿ (OO)
￿




2￿ (NN) + 1
4￿ (NO) + 0￿ (AB) + 1
2￿ (OO)
￿
(FL ￿ R) = 0 (24)
that is, substituting for the value of Q;
E￿ = Q(FH ￿ W ￿ cC) + (1 ￿ Q)(FL ￿ R) = 0 (25)
De￿nition 1 The cost of replacement of human capital that a consulting group faces each






That is, the pro￿t of the consulting group (zero in expectation) is positive in the "good match"
state and negative in the "bad match" state.
17
Proposition 6 If the replacement cost C is sustainable, then the consulting group has
a dominant strategy that consists in always sending the right match when possible,
(r = 1;p = 1;w = 0) which is optimal for every c;a chosen by the other players.
Proof. See appendix.





0 ￿ R ￿ W




as the sensible price condition.
3.7 Equilibrium outcome
We have shown that our market for consulting services is characterized by an assignment
equilibrium in pure dominant strategies, where the customer always captures when the match
is good (c = 1) and the consulting group always assigns the best possible consultant, given the
client’s request and the state endowment: (r = p = 1;w = 0):
We must now ￿nd the other component of this equilibrium. That is, we have to verify
that there exists a price vector (FH;FL;W) such that the three players are all playing their best
response given the opponents’ strategy.
17 If this condition fails to hold, we could have that the consulting group makes negative pro￿ts in the
good match state and positive pro￿ts in the bad match state, to break even in expectation. The equilibrium
outcome would change dramatically because in this case the consulting group would have an incentive to produce
a mismatch, whenever possible. Even if there are no technical reasons to impose this restriction on C, we don’t
thinkthispartoftheequilibriumstrategyiseconomicallysensible. Therefore, weassumesustainablereplacement
cost and limit our analysis to the case in which the incentives work in the same direction for all the players in the
model.22
Firstofall, wecomputetheinvariantprobabilitydistributionvectorundertheassumption





















the associated between-state transition matrix is:
P =















It is immediate to notice that the state AB has probability zero under this strategy and so
becomes a transient state. Intuitively, for this to be an equilibrium strategy the cost of
replacement of human capital has to be less than the fee charged by the consulting group
for a good match.
Looking at the problem of the client, we ￿rst observe that the probability of getting a






In correspondence to our equilibrium, c = 1;p = r = 1;w = 0; the two components of the




U (!1) = W + ￿
2s + ￿U
U (!2) = R + ￿U
V (!1) = (1 ￿ FH) + ￿
2s + ￿V
V (!2) = R + ￿V
(31)
The condition on the net surplus s > 0; re￿ects the optimality of both c = 1 and a = 1:
This is because we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium and the assumption of Nash
bargaining between consultant and customer/potential employer rules out the possibility of
opposite incentives between these counterparts. In fact the decision criterion is s > 0 for both.23
































In this equilibrium we have:
U =
(30 ￿ 12￿)W + 20R + ￿
￿






(5 ￿ 2￿)(30 ￿ 12￿)W + 20(5 ￿ 2￿)R + 5(2 + 3C)
￿




50(1 ￿ ￿)(5 ￿ 2￿)
(35)
which is non-negative for all values of the discount factor and thus satis￿es the condition on
sensible prices.
Proposition 7 The pure strategy equilibrium of this market is given by a price vector P =
[FH;FL;W], and an allocation rule of human resources, summarized by the probability vector
[r;w;p;c] = [1;0;1;1]; such that all the following conditions are simultaneously satis￿ed:
￿ = 0 (36)




(FH ￿ W ￿ C) +
2
5
(FL ￿ R) = 0 (37)
The incentive constraint (IC) of the consulting group: p = 1:
FH ￿ W ￿ C ￿




10 ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿
2￿ (FL ￿ R) (38)24
The incentive constraint (IC) of the consulting group: r = 1 , w = 0:
FH ￿ W ￿ C ￿
10(2 ￿ ￿)
￿
30 ￿ 13￿ ￿ ￿
2￿ (FL ￿ R) (39)
The participation constraint (PC) of the consultant:
U ￿ 0 (40)
The participation constraint (PC) of the client:
V ￿ 0 (41)
The positive net surplus condition:
s =
(4(1 ￿ ￿) + 6(1 ￿ ￿)(FH ￿ W) + 4(1 ￿ ￿)(FL ￿ R))
2(1 ￿ ￿)(5 ￿ 2￿)
> 0 (42)




0 ￿ R ￿ W





We have assumed throughout that the consulting group does not price the real option;
that is, we do not allow for premiums on capturing. This choice is not random. When we began
to inquire into strategic poaching by clients in business consulting, we conducted interviews
with partners and CEOs in the sector in order to assess perceptions of the importance of
this opportunistic practice and to discover the most common retaining policies, if any, that
consulting ￿rms employ to prevent or to react to poaching.
We found that consulting groups tend to put the relationship with clients above the need
to retain their consultants. Accordingly, they always seek to form the best possible match for
the customer’s request. In other words, they prefer to count on the long run advantages that
may ensue, such as network and reputation effects, rather than actively ￿ght poaching. In fact,
the degree of competition in this market makes it dif￿cult indeed to follow any alternative
strategy: if losing the investment in human capital is costly, losing a client because of a25
bad signalling policy (the imposition of tedious no hire covenants) or suboptimal assignment
behavior is seen as irreversible.
As to possible retention strategies, legal remedies may be either non-competition or no-
hire covenants, depending on which contract they refer to (the employment contract or the
consulting contract). From our interviews we gleaned that the weak point of such contract
clauses is lack in enforceability, i.e. the extent to which these restrictions are applicable once
they are brought to the attention of a court. In the non-competition case Omniplex World
Services Corp. vs. US Investigation Services Inc. et al, the US Court of Appeals found that
the restrictive covenant at issue was overly broad because it had no geographic speci￿cation, (it
was in effect a worldwide covenant), it had no duration speci￿cation, and it failed to specify a
function scope. In the preliminary discussion of the judicial case it emerged that the standards
usually applied in reviewing a covenant not to compete in a poaching case are well established.
"A non-competition agreement between an employer and an employee will be enforced if the
contract is narrowly drawn to protect the employer’s legitimate business interest, is not unduly
burdensome on the employee’s ability to earn a living, and is not against public policy."
18
3.8 Limiting behavior
Our model shows that it is impossible, without imposing a price on the real option, to
avoid or even to limit capturing behavior by clients. We also ￿nd that this strategy pro￿le
further depresses the quality output provided by the market. In fact, customers hiring their
experimented consultants end up introducing a consumption externality in the industry: the
consulting group loses known human resources and has to replace them with new employees,
whose type is a priori unknown. This circumstance induces a lower steady state probability
of providing a good match (Q is lower), as the level of uncertainty in the market increases.
With particular reference to this outcome, it is worth asking what the determinants are and
how we coul get a different result. First, notice that the only way to eliminate the consumption
externality is to induce an equilibrium outcome in which c = 0 is the client’s best response.
This would be possible if and only if the net surplus was non-positive: s ￿ 0: In this case,
the client wouldn’t capture the consultant and would go back to the consulting group in the
18 Modern Events Inc. vs Stinnett, 263 Va. 491, 493, 561 S.E. 2d 694, 695 (2002); Simmons vs Miller, 261
Va. 561, 580, 581, 544 S.E. 2d 666, 678 (2001).26
following period. To make the surplus non-positive, the market should always be able to offer
the good match, so that the client is at least indifferent between capturing or not. Therefore,
if the replacement cost C is negligible (that is, if C ! 0), then Q = 1 is the only quality
level that can sustain such an outcome. But we have seen that in our model, due to capacity
constraints on the consulting group, the maximum value for Q is Qmax = 3
4: Thus, Q = 1 can
never be reached, not even in a theoretical equilibrium entailing c￿ = 0: This holds as long
as the human resources inventory of the consulting group consists of only two consultants per
period. In fact, we would always have to assign positive probability to the state OO; where
the group is stuck with the same consultant pro￿le and this pro￿le doesn’t match the request.
If we relax this assumption and we allow for larger inventory, then, at the limit, we can reach
a situation with Q ! 1: A very big consulting ￿rm can count on a number of consultants that
is large enough to make the probability of the non-strategic states negligible. In this case, if
Pr(OO::::O) ! 0; then the AB state becomes the only absorbing state in the Markov process.








































we can see that at the limit:
Q ! p (46)
Hence, the following holds:
Proposition 8 If the number of consultants available at the consulting group in each period
is large enough and the replacement cost is negligible, then






















C. Q ! p27
Moreover, it is easy to show that the limiting equilibrium in this case is given by a pair
of probabilities (p￿;c￿) = (1;0): Hence, our quality variable Q approaches the unity:
Q￿ ! 1:
Proof. See appendix.
According to the result of Proposition 11, it is possible to reach the ￿rst best and to avoid
capturing, if the variety of human capital available at the consulting group is great enough
to exclude, in the limiting case, the non-strategic states. If this is so, then the middleman
encounters no obstacles in designing its optimal assignment strategy. This result is appealing
whenwelookatastylizedfactregardingtheevolutionofconsultingservices’marketstructure.
InarecentsectoranalysisbytheBureauofLaborStatistics, showsatendencytoconcentration,
i.e. a smaller number of larger consulting companies. Intuitively, if consulting ￿rms gained
market power, they could charge higher fees (the zero pro￿t constraint wouldn’t bind) and
they could use their extra margins to offer their consultants monetary incentives ("golden
handcuffs"), up to the point where the net surplus becomes negative and poaching ceases.
It would be interesting to investigate whether the intention to overcome inventory
capacity constraints, as part of a human capital retention strategy, may be one of the
determinants of concentration. The relation between market structure developments and
consulting ￿rms’ strategic behavior goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it would be an
interesting topic for future research.
4. Concluding remarks
Clemons and Hitt de￿ne poaching as "the risk that in any contractual relationship,
information that is transferred between parties for purposes speci￿ed in the contract will
deliberately be used by the receiving party for purposes outside the contract, to its own
economic bene￿t and to the detriment of the party that provided the information" (Clemons
and Hitt, 2001). In this paper we have analyzed the phenomenon of poaching in the consulting
industry, where customers may have an incentive to hire consultants, once they have tested
their ability on the job.28
In our framework, consulting services are traded in a complex market, where the two-
sided matching process is not random but directed by a strategic player, the consulting group.
This middleman acts as a match maker and strategically assigns consultants to clients, given
current and future requests, their available human capital endowment (what types of consultant
are in its inventory) and the vector of market prices.
We modelled the consulting groups’ assignment mechanism as an endogenous Markov
process with learning and capacity constraints. Through this process we generated the quality
variable Q; the probability of a "good" match. Next, we examined the strategic market
interaction of the three players: consulting groups, client ￿rms and consultants taking Q as
given. We have explained how the market for consulting services is a market for quality
goods with externalities. Given technological constraints faced by the consulting groups,
such as limited inventory and replacement costs, they cannot guarantee a good match, (so
that in equilibrium Q < 1 ), which makes it impossible to conceal social and individual
optimality. Each time a good match is realized, the consultant and the client form a bilateral
monopoly, who bargain on a new employment contract. We proved that under the assumption
of sustainable replacement costs, if no price is set on the capturing option, the dominant
strategy for the consulting group is to provide the best expected quality, given its current
inventory and market fees, and for the client to capture the consultant whenever a good match
is sent. The ultimate outcome is, accordingly, a negative impact on the equilibrium market
quality, due to consumption externality. As a consequence even when the consulting group is
present to serve as an intermediary, inef￿ciencies will persist in this market.Appendix
De￿nition 3 Let Xk with k 2 N, denote a Markov chain with transition function P, and let !1;!2 denote some
arbitrary pair of states in￿:
A. The state!1 has access to the state!2, if
P[X(m) = !2jX(0) = !1] > 0 (1)
for somem inN that possibly depends on!1 and!2: In other words, it is possible to move (inm steps) from!1
to!2 with positive probability.
B. The states!1 and!2 communicate, if!1 has access to!2 and!2 has access to!1:
C. The Markov chain (equivalently its transition function) is said to be irreducible, if all pairs of states communicate.19
De￿nition 4 An irreducible Markov chainXk withk 2 N is aperiodic, if there exists some state! in￿ such that
P[X(1) = !jX(0) = !] > 0
This means that a suf￿cient condition for a chain to be aperiodic is that there is at least one state that has positive
probability of transiting to itself.
Proof. [Proposition 1] We ￿rst show that the Markov Chain is irreducible. We know from De￿nition 4, that a Markov
process is irreducible if all of the states can be reached starting from any other state with positive probability, even not in one
step. The suf￿cient condition is that the transition matrix doesn’t have an empty line, i.e. there be no state that can be reached
only starting from some speci￿c other state. The matrix T is such that for every row index i and column index j, there exist
at least an element tij > 0: Therefore in a ￿nite number of steps it is possible to reach every state from every other state
To prove that our Markov chain is aperiodic we refer to the Corollary of Wilhelm Huisinga, and Eike Meerbach, which
provides a suf￿cient condition. To satisfy this condition we need that there is at least one state that has positive probability of
transiting to itself, and we satisfy this condition.
19 For the proof we refer to An Introduction to the theory of discrete time Markov chains on countable state
spaces by Wilhelm Huisinga, & Eike Meerbach.30



















































































2 ￿ (NN) +
2rc+(2￿c)(2￿r￿w)





4 ￿ (NO) + pc￿ (AB)
￿
(1￿w)+(1￿r)(1￿c)






















2 ￿ (NN) ￿ rc
2 ￿ (NO)
￿2￿c
2 ￿ (NN) +
2rc+(2￿c)(2￿r￿w)




4 ￿ (NO) + pc￿ (AB)
￿
(1￿w)+(1￿r)(1￿c)



























(2 ￿ c)[(1 ￿ r) + (1 ￿ w)(1 ￿ c)]







2 + 4pc(2 ￿ c) + (2 ￿ c)[(1 ￿ r) + (1 ￿ w)(1 ￿ c)] + 2p(2 ￿ c)[(1 ￿ w) + (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ c)]
Proof. [Proposition 3] We want to show that c = 1 is a dominant strategy for the match. Let c
# be the social capturing
rate, prevailing in the economy. We want to prove that an individual match always has an incentive to capture, because no
matter the value of c
#; the joint net surplus from a good match is always positive.








U (!2) = R + ￿U




V (!2) = ￿FL + ￿V
then, given that
￿
U = QU (!1) + (1 ￿ Q)U (!2)
V = QV (!1) + (1 ￿ Q)V (!2)
20 Obviously this invariant distribution is unique up to each admissible combination for the parameter value.31













= Q(1 + W ￿ FH) + (1 ￿ Q)(R ￿ FL) + Q￿c
#s
recalling that
￿ = Q(FH ￿ W ￿ cC) + (1 ￿ Q)(FL ￿ R)







1 ￿ ￿ + ￿Qc#
The denominator of this expression is always positive, for every ￿ 2 (0;1); and every c and Q in [0;1]: Thus the sign of the
fraction is the same as the sign of the numerator







(1 ￿ Q) + Qc
#C > 0
but this is always true, for every value of the parameters. So the net surplus is always positive and the clients will always have
an incentive to capture the consultant in case of a good match.
It interesting to notice how, if the replacement cost was null, C = 0; a probability of good match equal to one could
make us able to reach indifference between capturing or not, while as long as we have a positive replacement cost the incentive
is always stronger, no matter how good is the quality that this market is able to guarantee and this looks quite interesting if we
think that the cost is paid only because of capturing.








￿ (s)￿ (s): The invariant distribution for state
s













































0) and by 2 I can rewrite the previous expression as
P
s





















￿ (s)￿ (s) + ￿￿: Therefore I have
shown that
22 () 23: (3)
Proof. [Proposition 5] Let’s rewrite the value function of the consulting group that is given by:
V (S) = (V (NN);V (ORN);V (OWN);V (AB);V (OOR);V (OOW))32




















(FH ￿ W ￿ cC + c￿V (NN) + (1 ￿ c)￿V (ON) + FL ￿ R + ￿V (ON))
V (ORN) = max
r
￿
r(FH ￿ W ￿ cC + c￿V (NN) + (1 ￿ c)￿V (ON))+
+(1 ￿ r)
￿ 1
2 (FH ￿ W ￿ cC + c￿V (NN) + (1 ￿ c)￿V (ON)) +
1
2 (FL ￿ R + ￿V (ON))
￿
￿
V (OWN) = max
w
￿
w(FL ￿ R + ￿V (ON)) + (1 ￿ w)
1
2 (FH ￿ W ￿ cC + c￿V (NN) + (1 ￿ c)￿V (ON))+
+(1 ￿ w)
1
2 (FL ￿ R + ￿V (ON))
￿
V (AB) = max
p
[p(FH ￿ W ￿ cC + c￿V (ON) + (1 ￿ c)￿V (AB)) + (1 ￿ p)(FL ￿ R + ￿V (AB))]
V (OOR) = FH ￿ W ￿ cC + c￿V (ON) + (1 ￿ c)￿V (OO)
V (OOW) = FL ￿ R + ￿V (OO)
We can focus the attention on the three strategic states, because in the other states, NN;OOR;OOW the control only enters
indirectly as they are monotone transformations of the V (￿) function in the strategic states. Then once the optimal values are
found for states ORN;OWN;AB they are optimal also in the other states.
Remark 1 First observe that in every state the value function is linear in the control, therefore we end up with a bang-
bang control. This means that we expect a probability vector of zeros and ones as a solution to our optimization problem. In
other words, if a dominant strategy exists, then it has to be a pure strategy.
Remark 2 By the Bellman Principle, the vector of degenerate probabilities [r
￿;w
￿;p
￿] = [1;0;1] is the solution of our




(FH ￿ W ￿ cC) ￿ (FL ￿ R) ￿ ￿c(V (ON) ￿ V (NN)) ￿ 0
(FH ￿ W ￿ cC) ￿ (FL ￿ R) ￿ ￿c(V (ON) ￿ V (NN)) + 2￿V (ON) ￿ 0
(FH ￿ W ￿ cC) ￿ (FL ￿ R) ￿ ￿c(V (ON) ￿ V (AB)) ￿ 0























(FH ￿ W ￿ cC)
(FL ￿ R)
￿33










































(FH ￿ W ￿ cC)
(FL ￿ R)
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(FH ￿ W ￿ cC)
(FL ￿ R)
￿
Solving for all the coef￿cients we obtain:
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
￿
(2 ￿ ￿c)[8(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c(2 + 4￿ ￿ 3￿c)] ￿ ￿c
￿




(FH ￿ W ￿ cC)￿
￿
￿
(2 ￿ ￿c)[8(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c(2 + 4￿ ￿ 3￿c)] ￿ ￿c
￿







2(8(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c(2 + 4￿ ￿ 3￿c) + 6￿ (2 ￿ c)) + ￿c
￿









8(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c(2 + 4￿ ￿ 3￿c) ￿ 2￿
￿











(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ c))[8(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c(2 + 4￿ ￿ 3￿c)] ￿ ￿c
￿




(FH ￿ W ￿ cC)￿
￿[(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ c))[8(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c(2 + 4￿ ￿ 3￿c)] ￿ 2￿c(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ c) + ￿c(1 ￿ ￿c))](FL ￿ R)
￿ 0
Given our assumption of sustainable replacement cost
FH ￿ W ￿ cC ￿ 0 (4)
and the zero expected pro￿t condition
Q(FH ￿ W ￿ cC) + (1 ￿ Q)(FL ￿ R) = 0
that together imply
(FL ￿ R) ￿ 0
the ￿rst inequality is always satis￿ed for any combination of values of the parameters c 2 [0;1] and ￿ 2 (0;1): In fact the
coef￿cient of (FH ￿ W ￿ cC) is always positive and the coef￿cient that multiplies ￿(FL ￿ R); that is a nonnegative term,
is nonnegative as well. Thus the ￿rst inequality is satis￿ed. Looking at the second inequality we observe that it is implied by
the ￿rst inequality iff
V (ON) ￿ 034
So this offers us a suf￿cient condition to show that the second condition is also satis￿ed.
V (ON) =
6(FH ￿ W ￿ cC) + 2(1 ￿ ￿c)(FL ￿ R)
[8(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c(2 + 4￿ ￿ 3￿c)]
￿ 0
The denominator is always positive, then we focus on the numerator:
6(FH ￿ W ￿ cC) + 2(1 ￿ ￿c)(FL ￿ R) ￿ 0











and the maximum possible value that the social quality can take is exactly Q
max =
3
4: Thus the second condition holds in an
equilibrium as well. In the third inequality it’s easy to see that the coef￿cient of (FH ￿ W ￿ cC) is positive for any c;￿ and
the same it’s true also for the one associated to [￿(FL ￿ R)]: Therefore we can conclude that all the three inequalities





for every value of the other players’ strategy.
Proof. [Proposition 6]





U (!1) = W +
￿
2s + ￿U
U (!2) = R + ￿U
V (!1) = (1 ￿ FH) +
￿
2s + ￿V
V (!2) = R + ￿V
The condition on the net surplus s > 0; re￿ects the optimality of both c = 1 and a = 1: This is due to the fact that I
am looking for a symmetric equilibrium and the assumption of Nash bargaining between consultant and customer/potential
employer rules out the possibility of opposite incentives between these counterparts. In fact the decision criterion is s > 0 for







































2Q(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ Q))W + 2(1 ￿ Q)R +
￿
Q￿ [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ Q)] + ￿








2Q(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ Q))(1 ￿ FH) ￿ 2(1 ￿ Q)FL +
￿
Q￿ [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ Q)] + ￿




Then, in general, the net surplus is
s =
1
2(1 ￿ ￿)(5 ￿ 2￿)
(4(1 ￿ ￿) + 6(1 ￿ ￿)(FH ￿ W) + 4(1 ￿ ￿)(FL ￿ R))




































then we obtain:by the zero pro￿t condition it’s easy to see how the left hand side is always nonnegative while the right hand
side is always non positive, thus:
FH ￿ W ￿ C > FL ￿ R
1.First of all by the zero pro￿t condition it’s easy to see how the left hand side is always nonnegative while the right hand
side is always non positive, thus:
FH ￿ W ￿ C > FL ￿ R
From the zero pro￿t condition we obtain:
(FL ￿ R) = ￿
3
2
(FH ￿ W ￿ C)
Under our initial assumption of sustainable costs, this expression tells us that in case of good match the Consulting
￿rm makes positive pro￿ts while in case a bad match occurs it will turn out in a loss.







(8 ￿ 5￿)(FH ￿ W ￿ C) ￿
￿
8(1 ￿ ￿)(4 ￿ ￿) + 2￿
2￿
(FL ￿ R) > 0
always satis￿ed.





that is obviously always true as the LHS is positive and the RHS is always negative.
4.Let’s turn the attention to the individual rationality constraints for the consultant, U ￿ 0: This constraint is:
U =
(30 ￿ 12￿)W + (20 ￿ 8￿)R + ￿
￿





and the inequality is always satis￿ed. Hence, as we were expecting, the consultant has always incentive to participate
in this market.
5.For the client, we turn the attention to the individual rationality constraint of the client ￿rm: V ￿ 0, that is
V =
(30 ￿ 12￿)(1 ￿ FH) ￿ (20 ￿ 8￿)FL + ￿
￿
















that provides an upper bound for W: Call










then, this condition implicitly states another constraint on the replacement cost C and in the reservation wage R: In
fact for W to be a sensible upper bound we need
W ￿ R
as the sensible prices constraint requires W ￿ R; then
R ￿
6(5 ￿ 2￿) + 2￿
￿






15 + 4￿ ￿ 10￿
2￿
￿ 2(5 ￿ 2￿)
￿
10(5 ￿ 2￿)
that must be nonnegative implying
C ￿
30 + 18￿ + 8￿
2 ￿ 20￿
3
30 ￿ 27￿ ￿ 12￿
2 + 30￿
3
that is always positive.
6.The positive net surplus condition
s =
1
2(1 ￿ ￿)(5 ￿ 2￿)
(4(1 ￿ ￿) + 6(1 ￿ ￿)(FH ￿ W) + 4(1 ￿ ￿)(FL ￿ R)) > 0




that is always satis￿ed 8 C ￿ 0:
7.From the condition 0 ￿ FL ￿ FH, that is from assuming that prices are well de￿ned we get:































Example 1 Suppose ￿ = 0:9; C =
3
2 and R =
1












and the zero pro￿t condition yields:
















if FL = R; that is the maximum value for the low fee. It is interesting to notice how the isopro￿t lines are parallel lines: they
do not have any intersection. This tells us that the ￿rst Welfare Theorem holds in our model, as it should be in a competitive
equilibrium market economy.




















2.The isopro￿t lines between FL = 0 and FL = R:
Proof. [Proposition 7] When we ask for the inventory of the consulting group to be large enough, we are asking
that for every client’s request A or B there exists at least a pair of consultants of known and distinct type. In this case the
recurrent state can be summarized by state AB. The probability of being stuck with the same type goes to zero and the38





















It is also straightforward to see that the probability of good match now coincides with the probability p of matching the
client’s request when the state isAB:
Q ! p
We are left to check that ifC ! 0; then the limiting equilibrium is given by a pair of probabilities(p￿;c￿)=(1;0):
1.The matching pair’s problem
We want to show that c = 0 can be part of an equilibrium strategy for the match. Let c
# be the social capturing rate,
prevailing in the economy. We want to prove that an individual match has always incentive to capture, because no
matter the value of c
#; the joint net surplus from a good match is always nonnegative.








U (!2) = R + ￿U




V (!2) = ￿FL + ￿V
then, given that
￿
U = QU (!1) + (1 ￿ Q)U (!2)
V = QV (!1) + (1 ￿ Q)V (!2)













= Q(1 + W ￿ FH) + (1 ￿ Q)(R ￿ FL) + Q￿c
#s
recalling that
￿ = Q(FH ￿ W) + (1 ￿ Q)(FL ￿ R)
in equilibrium, when the expected long run pro￿t is equal to zero, we have:
s =
1 ￿ Q
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿Qc#
The denominator of this expression is always positive, for every ￿ 2 (0;1); and every c and Q in [0;1]: Thus the sign of the
fraction is the same sign of the numerator that is
s ￿ 0 , 1 ￿ Q ￿ 039
that is iff
1 ￿ Q = 0
Q
￿ = 1
We have to check whether or notQ = p = 1 is a best response for the cobnsulting group.
2.The consulting group’s problem.
Let’s rewrite the value function of the consulting group that is given by:
V (S) = V (AB)
V (AB) = max
p
[p(FH ￿ W) + (1 ￿ p)(FL ￿ R) + ￿V (AB)]
Isp = 1 optimal? It is trivial to see that, given thatFH￿W ￿ F L￿R; then the consulting group has always incentive
to send the right consultant and
p
￿= 1
Thus, our quality variableQ approaches the unity: Q￿! 1:40
References
Acemoglu, D. (1997). Training and innovation in an imperfect labor markets. The Review
of Economic Studies 64(3), 445￿464.
Acemoglu, D. and R. Shimer (1999). Holdups and ef￿ciency with search frictions.
International Economic Review 40(4, Special Issue on Search, Matching and Related
Topics), 827￿849.
Andrew Hertzberg, J. M. L. and D. Paravisini (2007). Information and incentives inside
the ￿rm: Evidence from loan of￿cers’ turnover. Mimeo.
Autor, D. H. (2001). Why do temporary help ￿rrms provide free general skills training?
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1409￿1448.
Autor, D. H. (2005). Do temporary help jobs improve labor market outcomes for low-
skilled workers? evidence from random assignments. Mimeo.
Bhattacharya, U. and A. Yavas (1993). In search of the right middleman. Economics
Letters 42, 341￿347.
Cappelli, P. (2000). A market-driven approach to retaining talent. Harvard Business
Review, 103￿111.
Clemons, E. K. and L. M. Hitt (2001). Poaching and the misappropriation of information:
An analysis of relationship risks in information-intensive production. mimeo.
Davis, S. J. (2001). The quality distribution of jobs and the structure of wages in search
equilibrium. NBER Working Paper Series (8434).
Gehrig, T. (1993). Intermediation in search markets. Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy 2, 97￿120.
Glosten, L. and P. Milgrom (1985). Bid, ask, and transaction prices in a specialist market
with heterogenously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics 13, 71￿100.
Huynh, H.-L.andR.Rosenthal(2000).Waitingforthegooddoctor: Informationinqueues.
Mimeo.
Jovanovic, B. (1979). Firm-speci￿c capital and turnover. The Journal of Political
Economy 87, 1246￿1260.
Kyle, A. S. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53(6), 1315￿
1335.
Laffont, J. J. and D. Martimort (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent
Model. Princeton.41
Lu, X. and R. P. McAfee (1996). Matching and expectations in a market with
heterogeneous agents. Advances in Applied Microeconomics 6, 121￿156.
Luiks, P. (2004). Global management consulting in change: The incredible shrinking
global consultant. Fortune Magazine, 1￿3.
Moen, E. R. (1997). Competitive search equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy 105(2),
385￿411.
Mortensen, D. (1985). Job Search and Labor Market Analysis. New York: North Holland.
Moscarini, G. (2005). Job matching and the wage distribution. Econometrica 73(2), 481￿
516.
Pissarides, C. (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. MIT Press.
Prescott, E. S. and R. M. Townsend (2003). Mechanism design and assignment models.
Mimeo.
Rubinstein, A. and A. Wolinsky (1987). Middlemen. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 102, 581￿593.
Shimer, R. and L. Smith (2000). Assortative matching and search. Econometrica 68(2),
343￿369.
Veldkamp, L. L. (2004). Slow boom, sudden crash. Journal of Economic Theory 124, 230￿
257.
Yavas, A. (1994). Middlemen in bilateral search markets. Journal of Labor




N.	 638	 –	 Comparative advantage patterns and domestic determinants in emerging countries: 
An  analysis  with  a  focus  on  technology,	 by	 Daniela	 Marconi	 and	Valeria	 Rolli	
(September	2007).
N.	 639	 –	 The generation gap: Relative earnings of young and old workers in Italy,	by	Alfonso	
Rosolia	and	Roberto	Torrini	(September	2007).
N.	 640	 –	 The financing of small innovative firms: The Italian case,	by	Silvia	Magri	(September	
2007).
N.	 641	 –	 Assessing financial contagion in the interbank market: Maximum entropy versus 
observed interbank lending patterns,	by	Paolo	Emilio	Mistrulli	(September	2007).
N.	 642	 –	 Detecting long memory co-movements in macroeconomic time series, by Gianluca	
Moretti	(September	2007).
N.	 643	 –	 The producer service sector in Italy: Long-term growth and its local determinants,	by	
Valter	Di	Giacinto	and	Giacinto	Micucci	(September	2007).
N.	 644	 –	 Aggregazioni bancarie e specializzazione nel credito alle PMI: peculiarità per area 
geografica,	by	Enrico	Beretta	and	Silvia	Del	Prete	(November	2007).
N.	 645	 –	 Costs and benefits of creditor concentration: An empirical approach,	by	Amanda	
Carmignani	and	Massimo	Omiccioli	(November	2007).
N.	 646	 –	 Does the underground economy hold back financial deepening? Evidence from the 
Italian credit market,	by	Giorgio	Gobbi	and	Roberta	Zizza	(November	2007).
N.	 647	 –	 Optimal monetary policy under low trend inflation,	by	Guido	Ascari	and	Tiziano	
Ropele	(November	2007).
N.	 648	 –	 Indici di bilancio e rendimenti di borsa: un’analisi per le banche italiane,	by	Angela	
Romagnoli	(November	2007).
N.	 649	 –	 Bank  profitability  and  taxation,  by	 Ugo	 Albertazzi	 and	 Leonardo	 Gambacorta	
(November	2007).
N.	 650	 –	 Modelling bank lending in the euro area: A non-linear approach, by	Leonardo	
Gambacorta	and	Carlotta	Rossi	(November	2007).
N.	 651	 –	 Revisiting poverty and welfare dominance, by	Gian	Maria	Tomat	(November	2007).
N.	 652	 –	 The general equilibrium effects of fiscal policy: Estimates for the euro area, by	
Lorenzo	Forni,	Libero	Monteforte	and	Luca	Sessa	(November	2007).
N.	 653	 –	 Securitisation  and  the  bank  lending  channel,	 by	 Yener	 Altunbas,	 Leonardo	
Gambacorta	and	David	Marqués	(November	2007).
N.		654	 –	 The cyclical response of fiscal policies in the euro area. Why do results of empirical 
research  differ  so  strongly?,	 by	 Roberto	 Golinelli	 and	 Sandro	 Momigliano	
(January	2008).
N.	 655	 –	 What’s behind “inflation perceptions”? A survey-based analysis of Italian consumers,	
by	Paolo	Del	Giovane,	Silvia	Fabiani	and	Roberto	Sabbatini	(January	2008).
N.		 656	 –	 The effects of fiscal policy in Italy: Evidence from a VAR model,	by	Raffaela	Giordano,	
Sandro	Momigliano,	Stefano	Neri	and	Roberto	Perotti	(January	2008).
N.		 657	 –	 Excess money growth and inflation dynamics,	by	Barbara	Roffia	and	Andrea	Zaghini	
(January	2008).
N.		 658	 –	 R&D and market structure in a horizontal differentiation framework,	by	Davide	
Fantino	(January	2008).
N.		 659	 –	 Housing market spillovers: Evidence from an estimated DSGE model,	by	Matteo	
Iacoviello	and	Stefano	Neri	(January	2008).
N.		 660	 –	 Real exchange rate volatility and disconnect: An empirical investigation,	by	Riccardo	
Cristadoro,	Andrea	Gerali,	Stefano	Neri	and	Massimiliano	Pisani	(April	2008).
N.		 661	 –	 The effect of investment tax credit: Evidence from an atypical programme in Italy,	by	
Raffaello	Bronzini,	Guido	de	Blasio,	Guido	Pellegrini	and	Alessandro	Scognamiglio	
(April	2008).
N.		 662	 –	 Accounting for sampling design in the SHIW,	by	Ivan	Faiella	(April	2008).
N.		 663	 –	 Delayed privatization,	by	Bernardo	Bortolotti	and	Paolo	Pinotti	(April	2008).
N.	 664	 –	 Portfolio  selection  with  mononotone  mean-variance  preferences,	 by	 Fabio	







L. DEDOLA and F. LIPPI, The monetary transmission mechanism: Evidence from the industries of 5 OECD 
countries, European Economic Review, 2005, Vol. 49, 6, pp. 1543-1569, TD No. 389 (December 
2000). 
D. Jr. MARCHETTI and F. NUCCI, Price stickiness and the contractionary effects of technology shocks. 
European Economic Review, Vol. 49, 5, pp. 1137-1164, TD No. 392 (February 2001). 
G. CORSETTI, M. PERICOLI and M. SBRACIA, Some contagion, some interdependence: More pitfalls in tests 
of financial contagion, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 24, 8, pp. 1177-1199, TD 
No. 408 (June 2001). 
GUISO L., L. PISTAFERRI and F. SCHIVARDI, Insurance within the firm. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
113,  5, pp. 1054-1087, TD No. 414 (August 2001) 
R. CRISTADORO, M. FORNI, L. REICHLIN and G. VERONESE, A core inflation indicator for the euro area, 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 37, 3, pp. 539-560, TD No. 435 (December 2001). 
F. ALTISSIMO, E. GAIOTTI and A. LOCARNO, Is money informative? Evidence from a large model used for 
policy analysis, Economic & Financial Modelling, Vol. 22, 2, pp. 285-304, TD No. 445 (July 2002). 
G. DE BLASIO and S. DI ADDARIO, Do workers benefit from industrial agglomeration?  Journal of regional 
Science, Vol. 45, (4), pp. 797-827, TD No. 453 (October 2002). 
G. DE BLASIO and S. DI ADDARIO, Salari, imprenditorialità e mobilità nei distretti industriali italiani, in L. 
F. Signorini, M. Omiccioli (eds.), Economie locali e competizione globale: il localismo industriale 
italiano di fronte a nuove sfide, Bologna, il Mulino, TD No. 453 (October 2002). 
R.  TORRINI,  Cross-country differences in self-employment rates: The role of institutions, Labour 
Economics, Vol. 12, 5, pp. 661-683, TD No. 459 (December 2002). 
A. CUKIERMAN and F. LIPPI, Endogenous monetary policy with unobserved potential output, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 29, 11, pp. 1951-1983, TD No. 493 (June 2004). 
M. OMICCIOLI, Il credito commerciale: problemi e teorie, in L. Cannari, S. Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), 
Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti finanziari e commerciali del credito tra imprese in Italia, 
Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 494 (June 2004). 
L. CANNARI, S. CHIRI and M. OMICCIOLI, Condizioni di pagamento e differenziazione della clientela, in L. 
Cannari, S. Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti finanziari e commerciali 
del credito tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 495 (June 2004). 
P. FINALDI RUSSO and L. LEVA, Il debito commerciale in Italia: quanto contano le motivazioni finanziarie?, in 
L. Cannari, S. Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti finanziari e commerciali 
del credito tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 496 (June 2004). 
A. CARMIGNANI, Funzionamento della giustizia civile e struttura finanziaria delle imprese: il ruolo del 
credito commerciale, in L. Cannari, S. Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti 
finanziari e commerciali del credito tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 497 (June 
2004). 
G. DE BLASIO, Credito commerciale e politica monetaria: una verifica basata sull’investimento in scorte, 
in L. Cannari, S. Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti finanziari e 
commerciali del credito tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 498 (June 2004). 
G. DE BLASIO, Does trade credit substitute bank credit? Evidence from firm-level data. Economic notes, 
Vol. 34, 1, pp. 85-112, TD No. 498 (June 2004). 
A. DI CESARE, Estimating expectations of shocks using option prices, The ICFAI Journal of Derivatives 
Markets, Vol. 2, 1, pp. 42-53, TD No. 506 (July 2004). 
M. BENVENUTI and M. GALLO, Il ricorso al "factoring" da parte delle imprese italiane, in L. Cannari, S. 
Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti finanziari e commerciali del credito 
tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 518 (October 2004). 
L. CASOLARO and L. GAMBACORTA, Redditività bancaria e ciclo economico, Bancaria, Vol. 61, 3, pp. 19-
27, TD No. 519 (October 2004). 
F. PANETTA,  F. SCHIVARDI and M. SHUM, Do mergers improve information? Evidence from the loan 
market, CEPR Discussion Paper, 4961, TD No. 521 (October 2004). P. DEL GIOVANE and R. SABBATINI, La divergenza tra inflazione rilevata e percepita in Italia, in P. Del 
Giovane, F. Lippi e R. Sabbatini (eds.), L'euro e l'inflazione: percezioni, fatti e analisi,  Bologna, 
Il Mulino,  TD No. 532 (December 2004). 
R. TORRINI, Quota dei profitti e redditività del capitale in Italia: un tentativo di interpretazione, Politica 
economica, Vol. 21, 1, pp. 7-41, TD No. 551 (June 2005). 
M. OMICCIOLI, Il credito commerciale come “collateral”, in L. Cannari, S. Chiri, M. Omiccioli (eds.), 
Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti finanziari e commerciali del credito tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, 
il Mulino, TD No. 553 (June 2005). 
L. CASOLARO,  L.  GAMBACORTA  and  L.  GUISO,  Regulation, formal and informal enforcement and the 
development of the household loan market. Lessons from Italy, in Bertola G., Grant C. and Disney 
R. (eds.) The Economics of Consumer Credit: European Experience and Lessons from the US, 
Boston, MIT Press, TD No. 560 (September 2005). 
S. DI ADDARIO and E. PATACCHINI, Lavorare in una grande città paga, ma poco, in Brucchi Luchino (ed.), 
Per un’analisi critica del mercato del lavoro, Bologna , Il Mulino, TD No. 570 (January 2006). 
P. ANGELINI and F. LIPPI, Did inflation really soar after the euro changeover? Indirect evidence from ATM 
withdrawals, CEPR Discussion Paper, 4950, TD No. 581 (March 2006). 
S. FEDERICO, Internazionalizzazione produttiva, distretti industriali e investimenti diretti all'estero, in L. F. 
Signorini, M. Omiccioli (eds.), Economie locali e competizione globale: il localismo industriale 
italiano di fronte a nuove sfide, Bologna, il Mulino, TD No. 592 (October 2002). 
S. DI  ADDARIO,  Job search in thick markets: Evidence from Italy, Oxford Discussion Paper 235, 





F. BUSETTI,  Tests of seasonal integration and cointegration in multivariate unobserved component 
models, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 21, 4, pp. 419-438, TD No. 476 (June 2003). 
C. BIANCOTTI, A polarization of inequality? The distribution of national Gini coefficients 1970-1996, 
Journal of Economic Inequality, Vol. 4, 1, pp. 1-32, TD No. 487 (March 2004). 
L. CANNARI and S. CHIRI, La bilancia dei pagamenti di parte corrente Nord-Sud (1998-2000), in L. 
Cannari, F. Panetta (a cura di), Il sistema finanziario e il Mezzogiorno: squilibri strutturali e divari 
finanziari, Bari, Cacucci, TD No. 490 (March 2004). 
M. BOFONDI and G. GOBBI, Information barriers to entry into credit markets, Review of Finance, Vol. 10, 
1, pp. 39-67,  TD No. 509 (July 2004). 
FUCHS W. and LIPPI F., Monetary union with voluntary participation, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 
73, pp. 437-457 TD No. 512  (July 2004). 
GAIOTTI E. and A. SECCHI, Is there a cost channel of monetary transmission? An investigation into the 
pricing behaviour of 2000 firms, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 38, 8, pp. 2013-2038 
TD No. 525 (December 2004). 
A. BRANDOLINI, P. CIPOLLONE and E. VIVIANO, Does the ILO definition capture all unemployment?, Journal 
of the European Economic Association, Vol. 4, 1, pp. 153-179, TD No. 529 (December 2004). 
A. BRANDOLINI, L. CANNARI, G. D’ALESSIO and I. FAIELLA, Household wealth distribution in Italy in the 
1990s, in E. N. Wolff (ed.) International Perspectives on Household Wealth, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, TD No. 530 (December 2004). 
P. DEL G IOVANE and R. SABBATINI, Perceived and measured inflation after the launch of the Euro: 
Explaining the gap in Italy, Giornale degli economisti e annali di economia, Vol. 65, 2 , pp. 155-
192, TD No. 532 (December 2004). 
M. CARUSO,  Monetary policy impulses, local output and the transmission mechanism, Giornale degli 
economisti e annali di economia, Vol. 65, 1, pp. 1-30, TD No. 537 (December 2004). 
A.  NOBILI,  Assessing the predictive power of financial spreads in the euro area: does parameters 
instability matter?, Empirical Economics, Vol. 31, 1, pp. 177-195, TD No. 544 (February 2005). 
L. GUISO and M. PAIELLA, The role of risk aversion in predicting individual behavior, In P. A. Chiappori e 
C. Gollier (eds.) Competitive Failures in Insurance Markets: Theory and Policy Implications, 
Monaco, CESifo, TD No. 546 (February 2005). G. M. TOMAT, Prices product differentiation and quality measurement: A comparison between hedonic 
and matched model methods, Research in Economics, Vol. 60, 1, pp. 54-68, TD No. 547 
(February 2005). 
F. LOTTI, E. SANTARELLI and M. VIVARELLI, Gibrat's law in a medium-technology industry: Empirical 
evidence for Italy, in E. Santarelli (ed.), Entrepreneurship, Growth, and Innovation: the Dynamics 
of Firms and Industries, New York, Springer, TD No. 555 (June 2005). 
F. BUSETTI, S. FABIANI and A. HARVEY, Convergence of prices and rates of inflation, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 68, 1, pp. 863-878, TD No. 575 (February 2006). 
M. CARUSO, Stock market fluctuations and money demand in Italy, 1913 - 2003, Economic Notes, Vol. 35, 
1, pp. 1-47, TD No. 576 (February 2006). 
S. IRANZO, F. SCHIVARDI and E. TOSETTI, Skill dispersion and productivity: An analysis with matched 
data, CEPR Discussion Paper, 5539, TD No. 577 (February 2006).   
R. BRONZINI and G. DE BLASIO, Evaluating the impact of investment incentives: The case of Italy’s Law 
488/92. Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 60, 2, pp. 327-349, TD No. 582 (March 2006). 
R. BRONZINI and G. DE BLASIO, Una valutazione degli incentivi pubblici agli investimenti, Rivista Italiana 
degli Economisti , Vol. 11, 3, pp. 331-362, TD No. 582 (March 2006). 
A. DI CESARE, Do market-based indicators anticipate rating agencies? Evidence for international banks,  
Economic Notes, Vol. 35, pp. 121-150,  TD No. 593 (May 2006). 
L.  DEDOLA  and  S.  NERI,  What does a technology shock do? A VAR analysis with model-based sign 
restrictions,  Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54, 2, pp. 512-549,  TD No. 607 (December 
2006). 
R. GOLINELLI and S.  MOMIGLIANO, Real-time determinants of fiscal policies in the euro area, Journal of 
Policy Modeling, Vol. 28, 9, pp. 943-964, TD No. 609 (December 2006). 
P. ANGELINI, S. GERLACH, G. GRANDE, A. LEVY, F. PANETTA, R. PERLI,S.  RAMASWAMY, M.  SCATIGNA 






L. CASOLARO. and G. GOBBI, Information technology and productivity changes in the banking industry, 
Economic Notes, Vol. 36, 1, pp. 43-76, TD No. 489 (March 2004). 
M. PAIELLA, Does wealth affect consumption? Evidence for Italy, Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 29, 1,  
pp. 189-205, TD No. 510 (July 2004). 
F. LIPPI. and S. NERI, Information variables for monetary policy in a small structural model of the euro 
area, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54, 4, pp. 1256-1270, TD No. 511 (July 2004). 
A. ANZUINI and A. LEVY, Monetary policy shocks in the new EU members: A VAR approach, Applied 
Economics, Vol. 39, 9, pp. 1147-1161,  TD No. 514 (July 2004). 
R. BRONZINI, FDI Inflows, agglomeration and host country firms' size: Evidence from Italy, Regional 
Studies, Vol. 41, 7, pp. 963-978, TD No. 526 (December 2004). 
L. MONTEFORTE,  Aggregation bias in macro models: Does it matter for the euro area?, Economic 
Modelling, 24, pp. 236-261, TD No. 534 (December 2004). 
A. DALMAZZO and G. DE BLASIO, Production and consumption externalities of human capital: An empirical 
study for Italy, Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 20, 2, pp. 359-382, TD No. 554 (June 2005). 
M. BUGAMELLI  and  R.  TEDESCHI,  Le strategie di prezzo delle imprese esportatrici italiane, Politica 
Economica, v. 3, pp. 321-350, TD No. 563 (November 2005). 
L.  GAMBACORTA  and  S.  IANNOTTI,  Are there asymmetries in the response of bank interest rates to 
monetary shocks?, Applied Economics, v. 39, 19, pp. 2503-2517,  TD No. 566 (November 2005). 
S. DI  ADDARIO  and  E.  PATACCHINI,  Wages and the city. Evidence from Italy, Development Studies 
Working Papers 231, Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano, TD No. 570 (January 2006). 
P. ANGELINI and F. LIPPI, Did prices really soar after the euro cash changeover? Evidence from ATM 
withdrawals, International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 3, 4, pp. 1-22, TD No. 581 (March 
2006). 
A. LOCARNO, Imperfect knowledge, adaptive learning and the bias against activist monetary policies, 
International Journal of Central Banking, v. 3, 3, pp. 47-85, TD No. 590 (May 2006). F.  LOTTI and J.  MARCUCCI,  Revisiting the empirical evidence on firms' money demand, Journal of 
Economics and Business, Vol. 59, 1, pp. 51-73, TD No. 595 (May 2006). 
P. CIPOLLONE and A. ROSOLIA, Social interactions in high school: Lessons from an earthquake, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 97, 3, pp. 948-965, TD No. 596 (September 2006). 
A. BRANDOLINI, Measurement of income distribution in supranational entities: The case of the European 
Union, in S. P. Jenkins e J. Micklewright (eds.), Inequality and Poverty Re-examined, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, TD No. 623 (April 2007). 
M. PAIELLA, The foregone gains of incomplete portfolios, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 20, 5, pp. 
1623-1646, TD No. 625 (April 2007). 
K.  BEHRENS,  A.  R.  LAMORGESE,  G.I.P.  OTTAVIANO  and  T.  TABUCHI,  Changes in transport and non 
transport costs: local vs. global impacts in a spatial network, Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, Vol. 37, 6, pp. 625-648, TD No. 628 (April 2007). 
G. ASCARI and T. ROPELE,  Optimal monetary policy under low trend inflation, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, v. 54, 8, pp. 2568-2583, TD No. 647 (November 2007). 
R. GIORDANO, S. MOMIGLIANO, S. NERI and R. PEROTTI, The Effects of Fiscal Policy in Italy: Evidence 





S. MOMIGLIANO, J. Henry and P. Hernández de Cos, The impact of government budget on prices: Evidence 
from macroeconometric models, Journal of Policy Modelling, v. 30, 1, pp. 123-143 TD No. 523 
(October 2004). 
P. DEL GIOVANE, S. FABIANI and R. SABATINI, What’s behind “inflation perceptions”? A survey-based 
analysis of Italian consumers, in P. Del Giovane e R. Sabbatini (eds.), The Euro Inflation and 






S. SIVIERO and D. TERLIZZESE, Macroeconomic forecasting: Debunking a few old wives’ tales, Journal of 
Business Cycle Measurement and Analysis, TD No. 395 (February 2001). 
P. ANGELINI, Liquidity and announcement effects in the euro area, Giornale degli economisti e annali di 
economia,  TD No. 451 (October 2002). 
S. MAGRI, Italian households' debt: The participation to the debt market and the size of the loan, Empirical 
Economics, TD No. 454 (October 2002). 
P. ANGELINI, P. DEL GIOVANE, S. SIVIERO and  D. TERLIZZESE, Monetary policy in a monetary union: What 
role for regional information?, International Journal of Central Banking, TD No. 457 (December 
2002). 
L. MONTEFORTE and S. SIVIERO, The Economic Consequences of Euro Area Modelling Shortcuts, Applied 
Economics, TD No. 458 (December 2002). 
L. GUISO and M. PAIELLA,, Risk aversion, wealth and background risk, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, TD No. 483 (September 2003). 
G. FERRERO, Monetary policy, learning and the speed of convergence, Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, TD No. 499 (June 2004). 
F. SCHIVARDI e R. TORRINI, Identifying the effects of firing restrictions through size-contingent Differences 
in regulation, Labour Economics,  TD No. 504 (giugno 2004). 
C. BIANCOTTI, G. D'ALESSIO and A. NERI, Measurement errors in the Bank of Italy’s survey of household 
income and wealth, Review of Income and Wealth, TD No. 520 (October 2004). 
D. Jr. MARCHETTI and F. Nucci, Pricing behavior and the response of hours to productivity shocks, 
Journal of Money Credit and Banking, TD No. 524 (December 2004). 
L. GAMBACORTA, How do banks set interest rates?, European Economic Review,  TD No. 542 (February 
2005). 
P. ANGELINI and A. Generale, On the evolution of firm size distributions, American Economic Review, TD 
No. 549 (June 2005). R. FELICI and M. PAGNINI,, Distance, bank heterogeneity and entry in local banking markets, The Journal 
of Industrial Economics, TD No. 557 (June 2005). 
M. BUGAMELLI and R. TEDESCHI,  Le strategie di prezzo delle imprese esportatrici italiane, Politica 
Economica, TD No. 563 (November 2005). 
S. DI ADDARIO and E. PATACCHINI, Wages and the city. Evidence from Italy, Labour Economics, TD No. 
570 (January 2006). 
M. BUGAMELLI and A. ROSOLIA,  Produttività e concorrenza estera, Rivista di politica economica, TD 
No. 578 (February 2006). 
PERICOLI M. and M. TABOGA, Canonical term-structure models with observable factors and the dynamics 
of bond risk premia, TD No. 580 (February 2006). 
E. VIVIANO, Entry regulations and labour market outcomes. Evidence from the Italian retail trade sector,  
Labour Economics,  TD No. 594 (May 2006). 
S. FEDERICO and G. A. MINERVA, Outward FDI and local employment growth in Italy, Review of World 
Economics, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,  TD No. 613 (February 2007). 
F. BUSETTI and A. HARVEY, Testing for trend, Econometric Theory  TD No. 614 (February 2007). 
V. CESTARI, P. DEL GIOVANE and C. ROSSI-ARNAUD, Memory for Prices and the Euro Cash Changeover: An 
Analysis for Cinema Prices in Italy, In P. Del Giovane e R. Sabbatini (eds.), The Euro Inflation and 
Consumers’ Perceptions. Lessons from Italy, Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer, TD No. 619 (February 2007). 
B. ROFFIA and A. ZAGHINI, Excess money growth and inflation dynamics, International Finance, TD No. 
629 (June 2007). 
M. DEL GATTO, GIANMARCO I. P. OTTAVIANO and M. PAGNINI, Openness to trade and  industry cost 
dispersion: Evidence from a panel of Italian firms, Journal of Regional Science, TD No. 635 
(June 2007). 
A. CIARLONE, P. PISELLI and G. TREBESCHI, Emerging Markets' Spreads and Global Financial Conditions, 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money, TD No. 637 (June 2007). 
S. MAGRI, The financing of small innovative firms: The Italian case,  Economics of Innovation and New 
Technology,  TD No. 640 (September 2007). 